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The Canadian Attack at
Amiens, 8-11 August 1918
Dean Chappelle

y mid-1918, the character of the First
World War had changed completely from
the relatively static previous three years of
battle. In March, the Germans had launched
their desperate gamble to win the war in a
single massive offensive and had been halted,
atgreatcosttobothsides, byJune. On 18July
the French, aided by American forces, launched
their highly successful counter-attack at
Soissons and demonstrated that the German
forces were far weaker than the previous year.
The opportunity was ripe to strike quickly and
in force. This occurred at 4:20a.m. on the 8th
of August when the Battle of Arniens opened
with the resounding crash of the combined
artillery of two armies. One of the most powerful
Allied forces ever assembled during the Great
War, consisting of the French First (Debeney)
and British Fourth (Rawlinson) Armies
strengthened by the Canadian Corps and the
entire British Cavalry and Tank Corps, rushed
forward and fell upon the first line of generally
ill-prepared and heavily outmatched Germans
just east of the important railway centre at
Amiens.

B

The attack, at least from a tactical/
operational point of view, was a complete
surprise. 1 By the end of the day, the Allies had
achieved their greatest victory of the War,
driving the Germans back as far as the old
1916lines. The Canadian Corps, forming the
Fourth Army's right flank, had taken their
"final" objective (designated by a blue dotted
line), save for the village of Le Quesnel and its
surrounding area on the extreme right flank,
and advanced to a maximum depth of eight

miles. On their left, the Australians had done
equally well, taking all of their objectives for a
maximum advance of seven miles. The French,
on the Canadian right, had also conducted
themselves admirably, advancing five miles.

"My chief anxiety [is the
Canadians] as they have the
most difficult job."
General Rawlinson,
diary entry on 5 August 1918.

The most disappointing advance was in the
extreme north, where the British Third Corps
had managed only a maximum penetration of
two miles, due largely to heavy German attacks
on their front during the previous three days.
Casualties, considering the ground gained,
were extremely light. The Canadians suffered
3, 868 (1 ,036 killed) and the Fourth Army as a
whole a comparatively "mere" 8,800, excluding
tank and air losses. The Germans gave their
casualties as 650-700 officers and 26-27,000
other ranks. Most of these losses represented
prisoners, as the Canadians alone took 5,033
for the day. 2
Mter the very successful first day, the
battle continued until 11 August when, for all
intents and purposes, it died down, and the
offensive was officially called to a halt on 18
August to allow time to bring up fresh reserves.
89
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The attack on 9 August saw further successes,
with a maximum gain of four miles on the
Canadian front. Following this, however,
resistance quickly stiffened due to the increased
number of German reserves, and the obvious
exhaustion of the attacking troops. The Allied
line had been pushed forward to a few miles
short of Roye, but remained far short of Ham,
the "final objective" outlined by Haig on 5
August (see below). Total British casualties
were 22,202, while the French suffered 24,232.
As with most German figures by 1918, an
accurate assessment of their casualties is
problematic, but they were estimated at 75,000,
over half of these prisoners. The British and
French captured some 500 enemy guns, in
addition to large numbers of machine guns,
mortars, vehicles, and other equipment. 3

The operation, originally foreseen as merely
an attack to free the Paris-Amiens railway from
German long-range guns, was first discussed
by Foch and Haig on 17 May 1918. It was then
to involve Rawlinson's Fourth Army, Debeney's
First French Army and some 200 tanks. It was,
however, only one of several options considered
at the time and no details were then put forth.
It was not until 13 July that Rawlinson was
given specific orders by GHQ to draft his plans
for an attack east of Amiens. The "fox" (as
Rawlinson had long been known) had in fact
been contemplating such an attack since the
small scale attack at Hamel on 4 July, involving
the Fourth Australian Division, a battalion of
the 33rd American Division, and 60 of the new
Mark V tanks of the 5th Tank Brigade. The
inclusion of the latter was quite significant as

The Battle of Amiens, 8 - 18 August 1918
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A Mark V tank advances down the Amiens-Roye road and passes German prisoners being sent to the rear.
(NAC PA 2946)

this was the first battle test of the new model,
much improved from its predecessor. The tank
attack was a great success, taking all of its
limited aims and managing to get all but three
of the Mk Vs to their final objectives, with only
one of these lost due to enemy fire. 4
The Hamel operation convinced Rawlinson
of the usefulness ofthe new machines and they
figured prominently in his 17 July outline for
the Arniens operation, as did the Australian
Corps. In addition to his present forces (the
whole of the Tank and Australian Corps), he
requested his Fourth Army be reinforced with
the Canadian Corps, which was to play an
important role in the attack. Originally, the
Australian Corps was to spearhead the main
thrust of the operation, but as the plan

progressed, the Canadians became equally
important and some would say most important
to the operation, as they not only had the most
difficult terrain in front of them, the swampy
and hilly Luce River Valley, but also formed the
important link with the French First Army on
the Corps' right, a source of potential difficulty
in co-ordination. 5
The objectives of the operation were
problematic almost from the beginning, due
largely to the fact that Fourth Army and GHQ
had differing conceptions about how the attack
should progress. Rawlinson and his staff, who
preferred strictly limited attacks, at least in
terms of distance, doubted that all of the
Ami ens outer defences could be reached on the
first day, particularly on the Canadian front
91
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where they were as much as 14,000 yards from
the jumping-off line and the terrain was so
difficult. This line was thus designated by a
dotted blue line on the Corps' front denoting,
undoubtedly, an objective of opportunity only,
as Fourth Army planners considered it
"unlikely" that the Canadians would reach this
point by the end of the first day. 6 This strongly
differed with GHQ's and particularly Haig's
conception of the attack. On 5 August, Haig
greatly complicated matters by insisting that
Fourth Army's plans be amended to push the
attack, ". . . in the general direction . . . [of]
Ham," several miles beyond the outer Ami ens
defences (not on this map, but several miles
east of Roye). noting that the Fourth Army
plans were too limited in scope. 7 Thus there
was some confusion over just what the
objectives ofthe operation were to be, reflected
clearly in the immediate pre-battle orders at
every level. This situation was, in fact, very
similar to that which existed prior to the Somme
attack in 1916, where few were sure of exact
objectives, and where Rawlinson favoured more
limited objectives than the more ambitious
ones put forth by Haig. Fortunately, weapons,
training, and tactical and operational command
had generally improved in the British
Expeditionary Force (BEF) by 1918 but, as
evidenced by this situation, strategic command
still possessed many of the old problems.
Despite such discrepancies in planning, 8
August was the most singularly successful
Allied day of the First World War. In the British
case it was seen as the supreme example of
how Great War battles could and should have
been conducted. Glowing narratives of the
operation are included in most histories of the
War, particularly those of the Canadian and
Australian forces. However, it was not the
"sand table" exercise presented by most
historians and many aspects of the battle did
not go according to plan. Although it is of
course true that very few battles come off
exactly as conceived, nearly all histories have
ignored the failings and problems of the Amiens
operation, particularly in the Canadian case.
In the end, the Canadian Corps had improved
significantly, even from its impressive attack
at Vimy Ridge sixteen months before, but still
retained several imperfections and
inconsistencies. The Corps was, in essence, a

near-perfected "traditional" force which had
developed extremely effective methods of
coordinating infantry-artillery attacks but was
largely unable to add the third piece of the
puzzle, tanks, due largely to inexperience and
lack of training with the machines. 8 Most of
these difficulties were representative of those
which existed in the BEF at the time. As is
often the case with the Great War, some
contextualization of the events is necessary.
Essentially, the first two phases of the
Canadian attack were relatively easy, mostly
due to the close support provided by the
artillery. It was in the third phase, the advance
and consolidation of the so-called blue dotted
line, that most of the difficulties surfaced. As
one report put it, "Beyond the Red line, the
aspect of the battle changed altogether." 9 The
problem most evident was the relative lack of
tank-infantry cooperation. As Fourth Army
and Tank Corps planners had feared before the
battle, the Canadians' lack of experience with
the machines resulted in a general
misunderstanding of their use. There were two
basic difficulties in this respect. The first, and
most apparent, was a marked over-dependence
on the machines by the infantry. A typical
report commented that:
Considering the ragged state of the defence [past the
red line] our advance was not rapid enough. Too
often, rather than manoeuvre out of a position held
by a few machine gunners. our troops waited for
tanks. 10

A similar commentary pointed out the tendency
of the infantry to halt if the tank attacking with
them was knocked out. 11 That is not to say that
this was universally the case, but this was
certainly a relatively common problem, as the
frequency of its mention attests. There was
also a failure, in many cases, of the infantry to
protect the flanks of the machines from antitank fire. The Mk V tank, although by far the
most able heavy tank of the Great War, was still
relatively "blind" and required infantry to
constantly seek out and destroy guns which, if
left to fire over open sights, could be extremely
effective versus armour. As one battle summary
noted, "Infantry must always remember that
they can assist tanks to get their objective. " 12
There seemed to be a slight degree of resentment
on both sides that the other arm was acting on
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A 60-pounder in action at Amiens.

its own and not coordinating its efforts. A postbattle meeting at Canadian Corps HQ, for
example, noted that although theinfantrymust
remember to carry out their duty of
reconnaissance for the machines: "There has
been a tendency on the part of the tanks to act
as an arm independent of the other arms, and
to forget that their action must be auxiliary to
that of the infantry." 13
The major causes of the Canadians'
difficulty in integrating armour into their system
were simple lack of experience and training
with the new weapon. They had no battle
experience whatsoever with the new Mark V
tank, which again had been introduced into
combat only one month before at Hamel, and in
previous battles had only worked with (and in
most cases little more than seen) earlier models
in very small numbers. They did undergo some
training with tanks during May and June of
1918, but due to the very intensive nature of
these exercises, armour was given only a

(NAC PA 2999)

cursory role, and it is not clear that they even
trained with the Mk V, probably not surprising
considering the then "secret" nature of the as
yet untried machine. In the one or two exercises
involving tanks, the other arms seemed
confused as to how to integrate the machines
into their already highly developed methods.
As William Rawling pointed out, in these
exercises the Canadians basically, "... learned
enough not to get run over by the beasts." 14
Both Fourth Army and the Tank Corps realised
this problem before the battle and urged that
steps be taken to correct this deficiency as
soon as possible. 15 Due to constraints of time,
however, there was little opportunity to improve
this situation before 8 August. Thus, as
previously noted, the Canadian Corps remained
an essentially "traditional" (i.e. nonmechanized) force, albeit a very effective one.
One solution which may have avoided some
ofthese problems, as suggested by many ofthe
reports, was unified command. AtArniens, the
93
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tanks were not directly under the orders of the
formation with which they attacked, but instead
acted on their own. In short, the tanks and the
infantry conducted two separate attacks aimed
at the same objectives. This problem could
have been solved, noted the post-battle
assessments, if the tanks allotted to an infantry
formation came directly under that formation's
orders, as was the case for artillery. 16 Although
this may seem an obvious step, it did not seem
to have occurred to the planners before Amiens,
perhaps due to the resistance to such an idea
by the Tank Corps, or to mere oversight.

"I do not know how long Haig
thought it would take us to reach
[the outer Amiens defences], but I do
know that neither he nor anyone else
expected us to reach it as we did by
the night of August 8th."
General Sir Arthur Currie,
from H.M. Urquart. Arthur Currie.

As the Canadian attack showed, there were
several other armour-related problems,
conceming the design and use of the machines
themselves. The first concerned the use of the
old Mk IV type machines as supply tanks. They
simply could not keep up to the rapid advance
of the infantry and Mk Vs. 17 The transportation
of vital supplies, particularly fuel and
ammunition for the tanks, to the forward
positions was often delayed at crucial points,
because the heavily burdened Mk IVs could
only manage about 1 mph over the rough
ground of the Luce River Valley. One engineer's
report characterized the supply tanks as,
"completely useless. " 18
The most severe difficulty in the area of
armoured design at Amiens was the complete
failure of the Mk V* troop carrying tank. The
concept of the machine was a good one on
paper: assault troops were carried in the tanks
to assist in taking the final objective, and thus
spared the exhaustion and hazards of marching
up on foot. It was, of course, a concept applied
successfully in the Second War and ever since.

Unfortunately, the Mk V* was far from an ideal
vehicle for this use. The design was a lengthened
Mk V, intended to carry up to twenty troops, in
addition to its crew of eight. The problem was
that the Mk Vs were very poorly ventilated.
Tank crews became somewhat accustomed to
the heat and fumes, although as will be seen,
even they had difficulty with prolonged
exposure. For an infantryman who had never
been in a tank in his life, to be put into a hot
and suffocating metal box for several hours
was more than most could handle. By the time
the tank-borne infantry reached their
objectives, they were oflittle fighting value, as
most became sick with the heat and fumes. In
fact, many had to be removed before the final
objective was reached, to march alongside the
machine. 19 One Canadian infantryman
described his journey in a Mk V* as, "... a sort
of pocket hell. "20 The Mk V* battalion attacking
with the Australians had similar experiences.
The unfortunate aspect, at least as far as
future development of armoured infantry
carriers, was the conclusion about the
experiment, as one report advanced: "It is
considered that tanks should not in [the) future
be employed in this way." 21 In hindsight, it is
unfortunate that the Mk V* was not employed
as a supply tank at Ami ens as it was well suited
for such a use, much more so than the refitted
Mk IVs used for this purpose.
Even the regular crews of the Mk V s
experienced difficulties with prolonged
exposure to the machine's heat and fumes.
They were no doubt more resistant than the
infantry, but they too could only bear the
hardships for so long. This was a problem
which could have been lessened and perhaps
eliminated all together by the simple provision
of replacement crews, a lesson which came out
of the Cambrai operation. Several reports
pointed out the discernible decrease in the
efficiency of the crews after even one full day of
combat in the tanks, ". . . no crew can be
expected to go into action and do itself justice
for more than two days running. "22 Thus, the
large number of tank casualties on the second
and third days could perhaps have been
reduced, if on the night of 8 August, fresh
crews had been rushed up to replace the
exhausted men who had spent twelve plus
hours in the unpleasant machines. 23
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The final difficulty with armour at Amiens
concemed the Whippet or Medium "A" tank, a
new weapon which first saw action on the 8th.
These new "medium" tanks, based on similar
French designs, were faster than their heavier
predecessors, armed only with machine guns,
and designed to attack with the cavalry. The
marriage of armour and cavalry, however, was
not a happy one. The Whippets could not keep
up to the cavalry and even if they did, the
cavalry could not aid the machines against the
enemy's main defence -well placed machine
gun nests. A better use for the Whippets, as
suggested by some post battle reports, would
have been to employ them with the Mk Vs and
infantry. One suggested the following, "... to
break through as far as possible with the heavy
tanks and to follow them up with the Whippets
and armoured cars, so as to keep the enemy on
the move." 24 Although this was a step in the
right direction, it is odd that none ofthe reports
suggested a use for the machines which would

seem natural - to protect the flanks of the
heavy tanks using their superior mobility. To
be fair, this was the first battle test of the
Whippet and most observers remained
enthusiastic about its future use, but it was
obvious to all that the employment of the
weapon with cavalry was a waste.
The cavalry operation which was launched
with the Whippets was the last large scale
employment of this former "arme blanche" in
British history. Such an action was not only
outdated, it actually impeded operations. The
cavalry did get to a lot of its objectives on the
blue dotted line, but was unable to hold them
without the infantry and tanks. It also appears
that the cavalry was largely responsible for the
failure to take Le Quesnel, the only part of the
dotted blue line not taken on 8 August, as this
was a primary objective on their front. The
cavalry was ordered, once the infantry had
reached the blue dotted line, to push

A Mark V tank passing the 8th Field Ambulance at Hangard, France.

(NAC PA 2888)
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immediately on to Roye, but were unable to
advance much past their positions on that line,
and completely unable to hold any position
past that point. 25 One of the major problems
was that the cavalry were very ineffective against
MGs and groups of enemy who had taken up
positions in wooded areas. The enemy positions
on the blue dotted line, and particularly past

problem arose when telephone wires, laid by
engineering and signal troops following the
infantry, were destroyed by the cavalry moving
up to the attack, which disrupted the already
problematic communications. 27
Despite all of these difficulties Amiens was
the most successful Allied operation of the

A Canadian-commanded tank having its war crest painted on before the Battle of Amiens.
(NAC PA 3667)

this point, consisted largely of such defences.
In such terrain the cavalry were also a detriment
to operations, due to the poor visibility. As one
report noted, " . . . we could have dealt with
certain situations with artillery and trench
mortar fire, but were in doubt to the location of
the cavalry. Their charges at many times ...
were exceedingly gallant, butfutile." 26 Another

Great War, and as the Canadians penetrated
furthest in that operation, some aspects of the
attack must have worked well. Foremost among
these was the artillery. The quick and relatively
easy capture of the green and red lines was
largely facilitated by the effectiveness of gunnery
in the BEFby 1918. The initial barrage, which
covered the advance to the green line, was
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especially devastating to the enemy defences.
Most impressive was the counter-battery work
performed by the Corps' gunners, under the
able guidance of Andrew McNaughton, which
silenced the enemy batteries quickly and
without which the attack would have ground
rapidly to a halt: "The enemy barrage at the
opening ofthe attack was fairly heavy, but was
quickly smothered by our [counterbattery] work
and [soon] the enemy shelling decreased almost
to zero." 28 The work of the artillery was even
more impressive when it is remembered that
they had less than a week to prepare for the
attack, due to the highly rapid and secretive
nature of the operation. The only real problems
experienced by the artillery on 8 August
occurred when the infantry had passed the red
line and were out of the range of field artillery
and out of the effective range of the heavy
artillery. Thus the guns, particularly the field
artillery, had to be rushed forward. Due to the
novelty of semi-open warfare, a faster advance
than anticipated, and the aforementioned
problems in communication, the guns had
great difficulty in keeping pace. One account
noted that the guns were usually only able to
offer support past the red line where the advance
was temporarily checked, allowing a lag time
for the field pieces to catch up. This problem
aside, the artillery was unquestionably the
most effective weapon on the Corps' front.
Provisions had also been made for the
employment of captured guns, and 26 ofthese
were put into action on 8 August by specially
trained gunners, who fired over 1, 500 rounds
from them at the retreating enemy. This was
an idea toyed with in the past, but first used
with great success at Amiens. 29 By this time
artillery was the "arme blanche" of the Corps
and of the BEF in general, due largely to the
experience of the previous two years and the
fact that the Canadian Corps was the only
permanent corps in the BEF, giving the gunners
and infantry ample time to develop a good
working relationship. 30 Even the Fourth Army
recognized this fact, and noted, ". . . the

Top: German prisoners wearing gas masks march to
rear carrying wounded while British tanks
advance to theJrunt.
(NAC PA 2951)
Bottom: Canadians wearing gas masks bring in a
wounded comrade.
(NAC PA 2863)
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advantages of the permanent Corps system . . .
(resulted] in a clearly defined artillery policy
and plan of action in the Corps. "31
Another formation of the Corps was also
instrumental in aiding the advance, particularly
in the early phases -the engineers. These
troops played their most vital role on the 3rd
Division's front, where the Luce flowed most
heavily across the Canadian area of attack. At
one point the river and accompanying wet
marshy ground was more than 200 yards wide.
The attacking troops held off the enemy while
the engineers constructed footbridges across
the river for the infantry. In several other areas
where the Luce cut the front the engineers
proved to be of equal value and thus made the
crossing of this very difficult obstacle look
relatively easy. 32

A Canadian armoured car, part of the Canadian
Independent Force, going into action at Amiens.
(NAC PA 3015)

On the Corps right flank, the big success
story concerned the Canadian Independent
Force, commanded by the able and innovative
Raymond Brutinel. This was the first battle in
which the CIF fought in its entirety and it
certainly proved itself. This force, composed
largely of machine guns mounted on armoured
cars as well as signal and cyclist units, had the
difficult task of coordinating its actions with
the attacking infantry, tanks and cavalry, while
securing the Amiens-Roye road and
maintaining contact with the French, to ensure
that the Canadian and French attacks did not
diverge. In addition to this, the CIF acted as a
reconnaissance unit, and in doing so harassed
the enemy, particularly past the blue dotted
line. The force's mobility was certainly a great
factor in its success. It penetrated some
distance past the blue dotted line and thus
played a valuable role in reconnaissance. Unlike
the infantry, a post-battle report of the CIF
noted that: "The training and lessons learnt on
recent open warfare manoeuvres were of the
greatest value, as all ranks understood the role
they had to play. "33 Among the most successful
weapons of the force was the employment of 6"
Newton mortars mounted on armoured cars.
These were essentially an early version of a
self-propelled gun and acted as an independent
unit. They engaged several enemy batteries
with a good deal of success, and provided the
CIFwith responsive, indirect fire support. Even
Fourth Army HQ realized the value of this
experimental weapon and recommended a great
increase in their use. Finally, the CIF also
aided the French on several occasions,
especially in outflanking strong points, as well
as sending back many useful reports from its
main task of reconnaissance. 34 That is not to
suggest that the force did not encounter
problems, as it would have been extremely odd
if a new formation of such an experimental
nature did not encounter difficulties in its first
attack. There was some lack of co-ordination
between the armoured cars and problems in
using these vehicles for frontal attacks. The
latter difficulty was no doubt caused by a
desire to keep the vehicles on the road, as they
were ill-equipped for off-road use. They were
also relatively vulnerable to enemy gun fire,
due to their high profile, which had to be
compensated for with speed. 35
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Germans captured by the Canadians at Amiens. The capture of so many prisoners was unprecedented on the
Western Front.
(NAC PA 2858)

The Canadian Corps possessed infantry of
a very high calibre, and although there remained
problems in integrating new methods into the
existing system, Canadian infantrymen stood
up to their reputation atAmiens, demonstrating
a great deal ofbravery and skill, as the advance
and the four Victoria Crosses awarded to their
ranks on 8 August attest. 36 The large number
of prisoners and guns captured for the day also
attested to the infantry's skill, as tanks, cavalry
and artillery units were not tasked or equipped
for the capture and holding of prisoners. The
advance, in all phases, depended on an infantry
willing to push on often under very difficult
circumstances. The troops were certainly given
extra drive by their great advance, as several
first hand accounts spoke of the elation felt by
all at such an advance after so many years of
static warfare. 37 The valour of the infantry was
especially evident in the advance from the red
to blue dotted lines, where they played a vital
role in securing the latter objective, when

planners believed that they would be unable to
be of much use in capturing such a distant and
well defended objective on the first day. Doyle
put it best when he noted that: "The Canadians
were on top of their form that day, and their
magnificent condition gave promise of the
splendid work which they were to do from that
hour until almost the last day of the war." 38
The Mk V tanks working with the Canadian
Corps also performed generally quite well,
despite the aforementioned problems. The
Germans captured in the battle were much
impressed by the new machine and realised
that it constituted a great improvement over
past models. The machines played an important
role, particularly in the advance from red to
blue dotted lines where they were useful in
attacking enemy MG nests. There are problems
with suggesting that the machines played the
decisive role in the victory of 8 August, as some
authors have done. While this holds some
99
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truth as far as the attack on the Australian
front, as demonstrated here they were far from
the decisive element on the Canadian.
It should not seem surprising that some
Canadian historians, such as Dancocks and
Nicholson, have seen Amiens as a whole as a
victory of artillery and infantry, while viewing
tanks as minimal factors in the success. These
authors, examining the Canadian attack only
and depending almost exclusively on Canadian
sources, have drawn the right conclusion as
far as the Canadian attack was concerned. The
problem, of course, arises when the whole
battle is characterized in this manner. But the
problem with Dancocks' conclusion that the
conception of Amiens as a great tank victory is
a myth, and Nicholson's similar comments, are
that tanks played a very effective role in the
Australian attack. 39 Conversely, Tim Travers
has suggested that the tanks played a great
role in the victory at Amiens, and uses
Australian accounts to prove his point. 40 Both
assessments are correct, depending on which
sector is examined in the most detail. The
battle was thus neither a complete break from
previous attacks, nor the logical conclusion of
earlier operations, but rather a somewhat
confused mix of the two, which reflected the
somewhat haphazard "trial and error" manner
in which the BEF developed during the Great
War. 41

NOTES
l.

2.
3.

4.

It is clear from the statements of German prisoners

captured on August 8th that the attack came as a
complete surprise. Some noted that they expected an
attack in the near future, but never as soon as 8August
and it was never anticipated that the Allies were
capable of assembling such a powerful force in secret.
G.W.L.Nicholson. CanadianExpeditionaryForce, 19141919. (Ottawa, 1962). p.407.
J.F.C. Fuller. Decisive Battles of the Western World,
1792-1944. ed.JohnTerraine. (London, 1954). pp.38l84.
"Operations of the Australian Corps against Hamel,
Bois de Hamel, and Bois de Vaire," July 1918. 2-16.
MG 30, E300, v.23, Odium Papers, National Archives
of Canada, Ottawa (hence NAC). For a description of
the improvements of the MkVtankoverthe MklV, see
below footnote l 7.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

It is clear from Rawlinson's initial memo that he
intended the Australians to be the main thrust of his
attack, which should not seem surprising as he had
worked with the force for the better part of four months
and had developed a good working relationship with
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